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KEEPING PREVENTION IN THE
CROSSHAIRS: A BETTER HIV
EXPOSURE LAW FOR MARYLAND
SARA KLEMM*
INTRODUCTION
In June 198 1, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported
findings of unusual opportunistic infections in the lungs of several gay men in Los
Angeles.' Doctors soon discovered cases involving similar infections among gay
men in other cities.2 By 1982, the medical community was referring to the disease
as "gay-related immune deficiency" (GRID) and hypothesized that it could be
sexually transmitted. It was not long before doctors found the same
immunodeficiency disorders in the heterosexual population-most notably among
intravenous drug users and hemophiliacs 4 -and more accurately termed the disease
"acquired immune deficiency syndrome" (AIDS).' By 1985, two independent
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I. Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1-3
(1981), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/june_5.htm.
2. See Current Trends Update: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (ADS)-United States, 32
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 688, 688-91 (1984), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000254.htm (reporting that as of December 1983,
71% of reported cases of AIDS affected homosexual or bisexual men, and that the cities with the highest
reported cases were New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami, and Newark).
3. Lawrence K. Altman, Clue Found on Homosexuals' Precancer Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 1982, at B8 (noting that scientists had designated the syndrome "GRID" and suspected the infection
was spread by sexual contact).
4. Current Trends Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 32
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 465, 465-67 (1983), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000137.htm.
5. Jean L. Marx, New Disease Baffles Medical Community, 217 SCIENCE 618, 618 (1982); see
also Matthew Carmody, Mandatory HIV Partner Notification: Efficacy, Legality, and Notions of
Traditional Public Health, 4 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 107, 109-10 (1999) (providing an overview of the
early demographics of the AIDS epidemic); Stanley M. Aronson, A Quarter Century of AIDS Research,
PROVIDENCE J. BULL. (R.I.), Dec. 18, 2006, at C5 (reporting that the virus was initially referred to as
gay-related immune deficiency (GRID), but later given the new "etiologically noncommittal" name
acquired immune deficiency syndrome, or AIDS, in recognition that heterosexuals were also contracting
the disease).
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teams of researchers made an important discovery when the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was isolated, realizing that the virus was the cause
6 7of AIDS.6 Tests for HIV were approved later that year.
Since its formal recognition nearly three decades ago, an estimated 25 million
people have died from AIDS, and another estimated 33.2 million globally are living
with HIV.8 Recent CDC estimates indicate that more than 56,000 people become
infected with HIV each year in the United States, and more than a million in the
United States are HIV-positive. 9 From the very start, public health efforts have
played a critical role in stemming the spread of HIV and AIDS.' ° Public health
measures relating to HIV/AIDS fall into three general categories: 1) surveillance,
case finding, screening, and reporting;" 2) prevention efforts including counseling
and education;' 2 and 3) case management and treatment of those who are infected.' 3
Public health-oriented HIV/AIDS prevention efforts have yielded significant
results, as the CDC reports that more than 350,000 HIV infections have been
avoided. 14 Specifically, the CDC points to prevention measures including HIV
testing, education, and counseling for individuals at risk for infection, and
6. W. Thomas Minahan, Disclosure Before Exposure: A Review of Ohio's HIV Criminalization
Statutes, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 83, 85 & n.33 (2009) (citing Phillip J. Hilts, The Doctor's World: U.S.
and France Finally Agree in Long Feud on AIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1991, at Al).
7. Id. at 85-86. For a detailed discussion of the origins and effects of HIV and AIDS, see id. at
84-86.
8. L. Gable et al., A Global Assessment of the Role of Law in the HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 123 PUB.
HEALTH 260, 260 (2009).
9. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV PREVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES: AT A
CRITICAL CROSSROADS 1 (2009), available at http://cdc.gov/hiv/resources/reports/pdf/hiv-prev-us.pdf
[hereinafter CDC CRITICAL CROSSROADS].
10. See generally Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health,
and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1019 (1989) (discussing early calls to focus resources on
education and counseling in the battle to stop the spread of AIDS). Professor Gostin cites to a prevention
plan published in 1985, and notes that it did not advocate for the use of compulsion. Id. at 1019 n.8
(citing James 0. Mason, Public Health Service Plan for the Prevention and Control ofAcquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 100 PUB. HEALTH REP. 453 (1985)).
11. Gable et al., supra note 8, at 261; see also CDC CRITICAL CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 6
(detailing new surveillance and data gathering tools); MD. HIV PREVENTION CMTY. PLANNING GROUP,
MD. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, MARYLAND'S COMPREHENSIVE HIV PREVENTION PLAN:
2004-2008, 12-16 (2007), available at http://www.dhmh.state.md.us/AIDS/reports/
StatewidePriorities.pdf (outlining Maryland's HIV trend-monitoring and reporting methods).
12. Gable et al., supra note 8, at 261; see also CDC CRITICAL CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 2-3
(providing a summary of proven HIV prevention interventions for HIV-positive individuals, including
counseling and education, as well as access to condoms).
13. Gable et al., supra note 8, at 261 (citing Thomas R. Frieden et al., Applying Public Health
Principles to the HIV Epidemic, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2397, 2397-2402 (2005)); see also CDC
CRITICAL CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 2-3 (describing treatment options, including anti-retroviral
therapy and substance abuse treatment).
14. CDC CRITICAL CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 1.
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substance abuse treatment and harm reduction methods, such as access to condoms
and sterile syringes, as key in the effort to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS. 15
In addition to prevention-oriented public health efforts, many states have also
elected to enact criminal statutes that are HIV-specific. 16 Although they vary
widely in approach, 17 these statutes generally make it a crime to knowingly transfer
or expose another person to HIV. 18 The laws were passed in part as a response to
political pressure to address the emerging epidemic, and are often described as
reflecting a general public morality surrounding the AIDS crisis. 19 Given the
reactive nature of many of the HIV-specific statutes, they have drawn a healthy
amount of criticism from scholars and advocates who maintain that they were
enacted without much deliberation about conflicting public health goals or the
needs of the HIV-positive community.
20
Maryland has had an HIV-specific statute in its criminal code for more than
twenty years.2 1 This Comment argues that Maryland can and must write a better
law to address the criminal concerns that arise when an HIV-positive individual
knowingly exposes another person to the virus in the context of a voluntary and
consensual sexual encounter.22 Part I provides a general overview and history of
HIV-specific criminal statutes, addressing both state-to-state variation among the
laws and the constitutional challenges that certain types of HIV-specific laws have
faced.23 Part II explores the way in which public health interests, which are
necessarily at the forefront of any measure dealing with a communicable disease,
15. Id. at 1-3.
16. DAVID W. WEBBER, AIDS AND THE LAW § 7.03[H], at 7-47 (4th ed. Supp. 2010).
17. Compare, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3435(a)(1), (c) (1995) (making it a misdemeanor for a
person infected with a "life threatening communicable disease" to engage in sexual intercourse or
sodomy with the intent to expose another to the disease), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (B), (D)
(LexisNexis 2006) (providing that an HIV-positive person who knowingly engages in sexual conduct
without first disclosing his status, and also ensuring his partner is capable of "appreciat[ing] the
significance of the knowledge" that he is HIV-positive, is guilty of "felonious assault").
18. See WEBBER, supra note 16, at 7-48 to 7-52 (detailing differences between various HIV-
specific statutes, including, inter alia, evidentiary and intent requirements, and affirmative defenses).
19. Id. at 7-47; see also Gable et al., supra note 8, at 262 (noting criminal HIV exposure laws are
"designed to reflect public morality or discourage socially undesirable behaviours").
20. See Scott Burris et al., Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial, 39
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 506 (2007) (noting that many advocates contend that HIV-specific criminal laws are
symbolic in nature and passed only to show that a legislature is taking action); J. Kelly Strader,
Criminalization as a Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435, 436,
446-47 (1994) (arguing that it is easier for a legislature to "forbid undefined risky activities and to omit
discussion of defenses" than to craft a carefully drawn, effective, and fair HIV-specific criminal statute,
and that legislatures need "more thought and less reaction").
21. Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Omnibus Bill, ch. 789, 1989 Md. Laws 4293, 4306 (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009)). Maryland's HIV
criminal transfer statute was enacted more than two decades ago, in 1989. Id.
22. See infra Parts III-IV.
23. See infra Part I.
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complicate the criminalization of HIV exposure when it occurs between consenting
adults within the intimacy of a sexual relationship.24 With public health goals in
mind, Part II then details three general classes of arguments raised against HIV-
specific statutes: 1) practical policy concerns; 25 2) fairness concerns relating to
defendants;26 and 3) fairness arguments relating to the HIV-positive community
generally.27 Parts III and IV focus on Maryland in particular, contending that
Maryland's HIV-specific statute is poorly drafted and misapplied,28 and therefore
arguing in favor of a more rigorously crafted statute that addresses both the
criminal and public health concerns implicated by HIV exposure and
transmission.
29
I. TWENTY-PLUS YEARS OF HIV-SPECIFIC CRIMINAL STATUTES
In 1989, the Maryland General Assembly passed legislation making it a
criminal offense for a person infected with HIV to "knowingly transfer or attempt
to transfer" the virus to another. 30 The law was passed as a part of a general
omnibus bill addressing various HIV-related matters, including procedures for
testing, disclosure of positive test results, and discrimination against HIV-positive
individuals.3 1 In creating a law that provided criminal liability specifically related
to HIV-exposure, Maryland joined a handful of states that had enacted statutes to
criminalize conduct related to the spread of HIV.32 One year later, Congress passed
the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act. 33 This legislation
provided states with federal funds for HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention,34 but
required that states either establish laws criminally prosecuting the intentional
transmission of HIV or demonstrate that already-existing law could do so before it
could take advantage of the funds available.35 Specifically, a state had the option of
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part lI.B.
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See infra Part 1II.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. Human Immunodeficiency Virus--Omnibus Bill, ch. 789, 1989 Md. Laws 4293, 4306 (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH--GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009)).
31. See generally id. (detailing contents of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Omnibus Bill).
32. See Ann LoLordo, New Tool for Prosecutors: Attempted Murder by HIV Infected Suspects Are
Called a "Loaded Gun ", BALT. SUN, Aug. 2, 1993, at I A (reporting that in 1986 states began enacting
new laws that criminalize the knowing exposure of others to HIV); Lynda Richardson, Wave of Laws
Aimed at People with H.I. V., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at Al (reporting that eight states passed laws
in 1989 providing criminal penalties for knowingly exposing people to H IV).
33. Pub. L. No. 101-381, § 101, 104 Stat. 576, 603 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47) (repealed
2000).
34. Id. § 2; James B. McArthur, Note, As the Tide Turns: The Changing HIV/AIDS Epidemic and
the Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 707, 715 (2009).
35. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act § 101, 104 Stat. at 603.
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prosecuting HIV transmission via traditional criminal laws, 36 or creating specific
laws to outlaw transfer of HtV.37 Not all states opted to pass specific criminal HIV
transfer statutes, 38 but by the time the federal certification requirement provision
was repealed in 2000, 39 every state had certified that its criminal laws could capture
and prosecute "knowing HIV exposure.'
'4°
A. HIV-Specific Legislation: A Brief History and Comparison
Two years before the Maryland legislature enacted its criminal HIV exposure
statute, President Ronald Reagan announced the formation of the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic.41 The Commission
issued a report urging states to use criminal laws to address the spread of HIV, and
further made suggestions as to the form specific statutes targeting H1V-transmitting
conduct should take.42 Specifically, the Commission recommended that states focus
on individuals who know they are infected and criminalize conduct that such
individuals should know has a high risk of HIV transmission.43 In addition to
clearly defining proscribed behaviors, the Commission also recommended that
statutes explicitly require HIV-infected individuals to disclose their status to sexual
36. Id.
37. Id.; Jodi Mosiello, Note, Why the Intentional Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) Should Be Criminalized Through the Use of Specific HIV Criminal Statutes, 15 N.Y. L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 595, 599 (1999). States without specific criminal HIV transfer statutes have
prosecuted cases involving conduct likely to transmit HIV under traditional laws including, inter alia,
"homicide, attempted homicide, assault, reckless endangerment, exposure of others to a communicable
disease, and sodomy." Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 358-59 (1990). In general, statutes dealing solely with HIV transmission
have targeted blood donation and sexual conduct. Id. at 37; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STATE
CRIMINAL STATUTES ON HIV TRANSMISSION (2008), http://www.aclu.org/images/asset-uploadfile292
_35655.pdf (detailing specific state laws targeting conduct likely to transmit HIV).
38. See Burris et al., supra note 20, at 490 (stating that New York has no HIV-specific law); Bill
Deener, AIDS Fight Moving into Nation 's Courtrooms: Criminal Cases Target Carriers Who Knowingly
Spread Virus, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 24, 1987, at IA ("Texas has no specific criminal statute
relating to the transmission of AIDS."). In 1989 Texas enacted a law making exposure to HIV a felony,
but the law was repealed in 1994 due to lack of prosecution. T.J. Milling, Texas AIDS Law OffBooks in
'94: No Convictions Obtained in Statute's Brief History, HOUs. CHRON., Sept. 5, 1993, at Cl.
39. Pub. L. No. 106-345, § 301(a), 114 Stat. 1319, 1345 (2000).
40. Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime and Punishment: Is There a Role for Criminal Law in
HIVPrevention Policy?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 821, 841 (2004).
41. Exec. Order No. 12,061, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,129, 24,129-30 (June 29, 1987); see also McArthur,
supra note 34, at 712-17 (discussing federal legislation leading up to and influencing states' decisions to
enact HIV-specific criminal statutes).
42. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON TIE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 130-31 (1988)
[hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N REPORT].
43. Id. at 131. Interestingly, the Commission also urged states not to criminally prosecute HIV-
positive individuals where the conduct alleged did not "involve a scientifically established mode of
transmission." Id.
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partners and to obtain consent before engaging in any sexual activity having a high
risk of HIV transmission."
According to recent research conducted by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), twenty-three states currently have criminal HIV exposure statutes
relating to consensual and voluntary sexual behavior in force. 45 These statutes vary
widely, including how specifically they define prohibited conduct,46 what, if any,
affirmative defenses are provided,4'7 and the penalties imposed for violations. 8
Some states go into great detail as to what behaviors are captured by their HIV-
specific criminal laws, while others more generally prohibit conduct that might
result in transmission of the virus. 49 A number of states also provide that informed
consent of the uninfected partner is either an affirmative defense or that non-
consent is an element of the prosecution. 50 Others specifically provide that use of a
condom while engaging in proscribed behavior is not a defense.51 Some of the
44. Id.
45. Am. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 37.
46. Compare, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (West 2006) (prohibiting unprotected
sexual activity and defining "sexual activity" to mean "insertive vaginal or anal intercourse on the part
of an infected male, receptive consensual vaginal intercourse on the part of an infected woman with a
male partner, or receptive consensual anal intercourse on the part of an infected man or woman with a
male partner"), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(a)(1), (b) (West 2002) (prohibiting a person
who knows he is HIV-positive to "engage[] in intimate contact with another," and defining "intimate
contact" to mean "the exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner
that could result in the transmission of HIV").
47. Compare, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(3)(a) (2002) (providing an affirmative defense of
informed consent where "the sexual activity took place between consenting adults after full disclosure
by the accused of the risk of such activity"), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(3) (1997) (providing
an affirmative defense where the sexual activity "took place between consenting adults after full
disclosure of the risk of such activity and with the use of an appropriate prophylactic device").
48. Compare, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1(3) (West 2003) ("Criminal transmission of the
human immunodeficiency virus is a class 'B' felony."), and State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 748
(Iowa 2006) (citing IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709C.1(3), 902.9(2)) (providing that an offender of the HIV
transmission statute is subject to a prison term of up to twenty-five years), with MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (providing a prison term of up to three years for
offenders).
49. Compare, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(c)(1) (2006) (clearly defining "sexual penetration"
and listing behaviors that qualify), and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (b)(1) (clearly defining
"sexual activity" and listing conduct that qualifies), and IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(2)(a), (b) (clearly
defining "body fluid" and "transfer"), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(b) (defining intimate
contact generally as exposure "in a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV"), and LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5(A) (2007) (generally prohibiting intentional exposure through "sexual contact").
50. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (using non-consent as an element of prosecution);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 2007) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(3)(a) (using consent as
an affirmative defense); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1(5) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677.1(2)(a)
(West 2004) (using non-consent as an element of prosecution); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.205.2
(LexisNexis 2006) (using consent as an affirmative defense); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109(c) (2006)
(same).
51. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677.4. Most statutes are completely silent on the use of
condoms, and no state court has ever allowed the fact that a defendant used a condom to serve as a
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starkest variations in law regard punishment.5 2 A handful of states provide authority
to sentence offenders to as many as twenty-five to thirty years in prison, although it
appears most states' courts tend to impose sentences in the one- to ten-year range.
53
Laws criminalizing HIV exposure also address important issues of intent and
risk in drastically different ways. For instance, California,54 Virginia,55 and
Washington 56 all require the prosecution to prove a defendant had the specific
intent to transfer HIV to another, or to cause "great bodily harm," in order to obtain
a conviction. California's statute further provides that "[e]vidence that the person
had knowledge of his or her HIV-positive status, without additional evidence, shall
not be sufficient to prove specific intent. 57 Most states, however, require only the
general intent to engage in prohibited conduct while knowing one is infected with
H1V.58 These laws are arguably flawed in that they may be applied with the same
force to offenders with very different levels of culpability regarding their intent to
harm the victim.5 9 The extent to which a statute might apply to conduct with little
or no risk of transmitting HIV is another manner in which statutes vary from state
to state.60 For example, California clearly prohibits only behaviors that have been
scientifically demonstrated to pose some degree of transmission risk,61 while other
complete defense. WEBBER, supra note 16, at 7-52 to 7-53. Additionally, North Dakota requires both
use of a condom or other "appropriate prophylactic device" and informed consent of the victim before a
defendant may assert an affirmative defense. Id. at 7-52 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(3)).
52. See Amy L. McGuire, Comment, AIDS as a Weapon: Criminal Prosecution of HIV Exposure,
36 Hous. L. REV. 1787, 1809 (1999) (discussing disparity in sentencing among the states with HIV-
specific statutes).
53. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(a) (West 2006) (providing for imprisonment
for three, five, or eight years); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (2007) (providing for up to ten years
imprisonment if convicted); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(1) (providing for up to fifteen years
imprisonment for conviction); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709C.1(3), 902.9(2) (providing up to twenty-five
years imprisonment for conviction); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5.E(l) (providing up to ten years
imprisonment with or without hard labor for conviction); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.205.1 (providing
imprisonment for not less than two years and not more than ten years). For a comparison and analysis
regarding sentences authorized for criminal exposure to HIV and drunk driving, see Wolf & Vezina,
supra note 40, at 872.
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(a).
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4:1 (A) (2009).
56. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.01 l(l)(b) (West 2009).
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(a).
58. WEBBER, supra note 16, at 7-54. Webber notes that in most states "the prosecution need only
prove that the defendant knew he or she was infected and then engaged in acts that created some risk of
transmission, even if transmission did not actually result." Id.
59. See Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws,
32 J. L. MED. & ETics 327, 331-32 (2004) (discussing issues of criminal intent as they relate to
different states' criminal HIV exposure laws).
60. Id. at 329.
61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(b)(1) (prohibiting only unprotected receptive or
insertive vaginal or anal intercourse).
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states prohibit acts that have been proven to carry extremely low levels of risk, if
any.
62
B. HIV-Specific Criminal Statutes: Not Unconstitutional
HIV-specific criminal exposure statutes have existed in many states for nearly
two decades now. During this period, a number of defendants charged under these
statutes have raised constitutional challenges. 63 These challenges tend to allege that
the statute in question is overbroad or unconstitutionally vague. 64 Defendants also
sometimes argue violations of First Amendment protections against compelled
speech65 or constraints on free association.66 A few states also have faced claims
that criminal HIV exposure statutes violate equal protection 67 and the right to
62. See, for example, the Arkansas and Michigan statutes, both of which criminalize the "intrusion,
however slight, of... any object into a genital or anal opening of another person's body." ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-123(c)(1) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 333.5210(2) (2001). Galletly and Pinkerton
point out that "the risk of transmitting HIV through non-contaminated objects is, of course, zero."
Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 329.
63. See generally WEBBER, supra note 16, at 7-56.1 to 7-61 (providing a detailed discussion of
various overbreadth and void-for-vagueness constitutional challenges in a number of different states);
David Kromm, Note, HIV-Specific Knowing Transmission Statutes: A Proposal to Help Fight an
Epidemic, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 253, 272-75 (discussing constitutional challenges in
Illinois and Michigan); McGuire, supra note 52, at 1810-12 (analyzing overbreadth, vagueness, and
substantive due process issues implicated in HIV-specific criminal statutes).
64. See, e.g., People v. Russell, 630 N.E.2d 794, 796 (11. 1994) (holding Illinois' statute not
unconstitutional as applied because it is "sufficiently clear and explicit so that a person of ordinary
intelligence need not have to guess at its meaning or application"); People v. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d 208,
223 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (holding Illinois' statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied because the
"defendant's conduct clearly fell within the proscription of the statute," and he thus had no standing to
raise constitutional issues as they may apply to other individuals or acts); State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d
360, 365 (Iowa 2001) (holding Iowa's statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied because it is
"sufficiently clear and consequently provides a reasonably intelligent person with fair notice of its
meaning"); State v. Gamberella, 633 So.2d 595, 603 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the language of
the Louisiana statute may capture sexual acts not capable of transmitting the virus, but nevertheless
holding it not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because the statute "offers a clear and definite
standard of conduct"); People v. Jensen, 586 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
Michigan's statute not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because the defendant's conduct was
"clearly encompassed by the language of the statute," and, because the statute "squarely applies to
defendant," she was precluded from an overbreadth challenge).
65. See, e.g., State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 742-45 (Iowa 2006) (finding Iowa's statute
compels speech but is nonetheless constitutional because it does not "compel public disclosure of an
infected person's HIV status," and the court could not "conceive of a less restrictive way" the state could
serve its compelling interest in protection of public health); Jensen, 586 N.W.2d at 759 (holding
Michigan's statute constitutional even though it "may significantly infringe on [the] defendant's
individual interests in remaining silent" because the state's public health interest in disclosure is
"undeniably overwhelming").
66. See, e.g., Russell, 630 N.E.2d at 796 (finding no infringement on the defendant's "supposed
right of intimate association").
67. E.g., Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 740 n. 1 (declining to consider Musser's equal protection claim on
appeal because he did not raise it in the district court); Gamberella, 633 So.2d at 604-05 (finding that
Louisiana's statute classifies individuals on the basis of physical condition (i.e., HIV status) but is
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privacy. 68 Defendants who have raised vagueness and overbreadth challenges
generally have failed because they do not raise structural First Amendment issues,
and therefore courts have only considered the constitutionality of statutes as applied
to the particular defendants. 69 To date, no state has struck its criminal HIV
exposure statute on constitutional grounds. 70 Despite the fact that some courts have
even applied strict scrutiny review,7' all courts have concluded that the state's
public health interests in preventing the spread of HIV, coupled with the deference
afforded states in the realm of criminal law are too strong to be overcome by the
constitutional concerns raised by defendants. 2
constitutionally sound because the classification "substantially furthers a legitimate state objective"); see
also Erin M. O'Toole, Note, HIV-Specific Crime Legislation: Targeting an Epidemic for Criminal
Prosecution, 10 J. L. & HEALTH 183, 203-05 (1995-1996). O'Toole makes the argument that, for
purposes of an equal protection analysis, the real class differentiation is not between HIV-positive and
HIV-negative people, but rather those HIV-positive people who are tested at confidential testing sites
and those HIV-positive people who either forego testing or get tested at anonymous testing centers. Id.
at 196. The critical difference between being tested at a confidential site as opposed to an anonymous
site is that the state can link an identity to test results produced at the former, but not the latter. Id.
Viewed in this light, O'Toole suggests the criminal HIV exposure statutes may not survive even rational
basis scrutiny because the law treats differently individuals who have voluntarily submitted to one form
of HIV testing. Id. at 204. The law thus has the effect of punishing those HIV-positive people who have
responsibly sought testing while "rewarding those who may in fact pose a greater public health danger
by not being tested." Id. at 205.
68. E.g., Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 747-48 (holding Iowa's statute does not unconstitutionally
infringe on the right to privacy because the state has a compelling interest in stemming the spread of
HIV and protecting human life). The Musser court distinguished the case from Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003), where the United States Supreme Court held that state laws that work to control
individuals' private sexual activity violated the due process right to liberty. Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 748.
In Musser, the court found that the challenged statute prohibited intimate sexual contact without "full
and mutual consent" from an HIV-positive person's partner, whereas Lawrence involved two adults
fully and mutually consenting to sexual activity. Id; see also Jensen, 586 N.W.2d at 757-58 (finding no
absolute right to privacy and holding Michigan's statute, while it "intrudes somewhat on the privacy of
an HIV-infected individual," constitutional because "this intrusion is significantly outweighed" by the
state's compelling interest in preventing the spread of HIV).
69. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (indicating that each court considered only an as-
applied challenge to the relevant HIV-specific laws); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
610 (1973) (noting that where a statute may constitutionally apply to a particular defendant, he may not
challenge the law on overbreadth grounds by arguing it may be unconstitutional as applied to others in
situations not presently before the court).
70. Isabel Grant, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The Criminalization of the Non-Disclosure
of HIV, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 123, 172-73 (2008); see also Amanda Weiss, Comment, Criminalizing
Consensual Transmission of HIV, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 397 (2006) (noting that courts have
"unfailingly upheld the constitutionality of state HIV statutes").
71. See, e.g., Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 744 (concluding strict scrutiny applied because HIV exposure
statute involved compelled speech that is not content-neutral); Gamberella, 633 So.2d at 604 & n.5
(concluding the state's constitution required application of strict scrutiny because the HIV exposure
statute burdened the fundamental right of privacy).
72. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (referring to a state's compelling interest in
public health generally and stopping the spread of HIV specifically). But see McGuire, supra note 52, at
1813 (suggesting that a state law attempting to prohibit conduct that does not carry a significant risk of
HIV transmission may render the state's interest insufficiently compelling).
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It has been more than twenty years since President Reagan's commission
published its specific recommendations that states consider when either evaluating
existing criminal HIV exposure laws or drafting new ones. 73 During this time
period, scholars and public health advocates have offered a range of perspectives
on these HIV-specific laws. 4 Some have continued to advocate for HIV exposure
statutes, suggesting that laws drafted with care and attention, which clearly define
prohibited conduct and provide affirmative defenses of informed consent and
condom use, can be an effective and fair way to address the epidemiological
problem.75 Others, especially in the intemational community,76 have expressed the
belief that criminalizing the transfer of HIV does far more harm than good, and
have accordingly called for the repeal of existing criminal HIV exposure statutes.77
Still others have elaborated on prior notions of narrow tailoring and specificity by
arguing that rigorous HIV exposure statutes should at minimum consider the level
of intent required for conviction, the specific conduct criminalized, the degree of
risk inherent in the behavior, and the parts disclosure and partner consent play in
decriminalizing otherwise proscribed behavior.78 These advocates argue further that
73. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 42 (indicating that the Report was published in
1988).
74. See generally Burris et al., supra note 20, at 469 (detailing different perspectives on the ability
of HIV-specific criminal laws to adequately address the AIDS crisis).
75. See, e.g., Strader, supra note 20, at 446. Strader astutely notes that HIV-specific criminal laws
are "politically difficult" and that legislatures are prone to not giving the matter much thought or
deliberation when enacting them. Id. at 446-47. Public discussion that would lead to "carefully defining
sex acts and applicable defenses" would demand legislators at least consider the notion that people
should be able to engage in same-sex sexual activities if they so wish, for instance. Id. at 446. Even
more, it may require legislators to acknowledge the complexity of sexual behavior and to allow for the
reality that often disclosure and safe sex are negotiated in non-verbal ways. Burris et al., supra note 20,
at 469.
76. See JOINT U.N. PROO. HIV/AIDS, CRIMINAL LAW, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND HIV TRANSMISSION:
A POLICY OPTIONS PAPER 12 (2002), available at http://data.unaids.org/publications/IRC-pub02/JC733-
CriminalLaw_en.pdf [hereinafter UNAIDS POLICY OPTIONS PAPER] (providing a number of
recommendations, from a group with international membership, that would sharply constrain the
application of the criminal law to cases of HIV exposure); Lawrence K. Altman, Seeking Better Laws on
HIV, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at All (reporting that the 17th International AIDS Conference
concluded with a call to repeal laws criminalizing groups at risk for HV).
77. See, e.g., JOINT U.N. PROG. HIV/AIDS, POLICY BRIEF: CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV
TRANSMISSION 1, 2, 6 (2008), http://data.unaids.org/pub/BaseDocument/2008/2008073 ljcl5l3_policy
criminalizationen.pdf [hereinafter UNAIDS BRIEF] (arguing that only general criminal law, and not
HIV-specific statutes, should be applied to acts constituting the intentional transmission of HIV); Edwin
Cameron et al., HIV Is a Virus, Not a Crime: Ten Reasons Against Criminal Statutes and Criminal
Prosecutions, 11 J. INT'L AIDS Soc'y (2008), http://www.jiasociety.org/content/pdf/1758-2652-11-
7.pdf (arguing that the criminal law cannot adequately address HIV infection and transmission, and that
the "sole rationale" is retribution and punishment, a "poor and distorted aim for public health
purposes"). Justice Edwin Cameron is a member of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and an
HIV-positive person who has advocated strongly for a "major international push-back against misguided
criminal laws and prosecutions." Altman, supra note 76.
78. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 331.
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statutes targeting HIV specifically should take care not to undermine public health
messages regarding what is or is not risky behavior.79 Lastly, some among the HIV-
positive community have suggested that, if the law requires those infected with
HIV to disclose their status, it should also protect those disclosing against
"unwanted secondary disclosure." 80
II. IMPORTANT TENSIONS: THE PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE COMPLICATES HIV-
SPECIFIC STATUTES
Criminal and public health interests are both implicated when an HIV-
positive individual knows his status and intentionally or recklessly engages in
behavior likely to expose another to the virus. Although targeted legislation in both
areas of law might be concerned with stemming the spread of HIV, 1 there are
inevitable tensions between the two approaches.8 2 The public health perspective is
first and foremost focused on prevention, and is thus particularly reliant on
individuals' willingness to be tested. 3 Public health officials and HIV prevention
counselors have traditionally underscored the importance of voluntariness,
confidentiality, and education in their efforts to combat the spread of the virus.84
Education is central to any HIV prevention scheme, and not only for those who are
diagnosed HIV-positive.8 5 Certainly it is imperative that any individual who carries
the virus be counseled as to what behaviors to avoid and how best to manage his
79. Id. at 336. Galletly and Pinkerton take issue particularly with the fact the nearly all HIV
exposure statutes are completely silent on condom use, an omission that "runs counter to prevailing
public health messages [that] stress practicing safer sex with all partners." Id. at 335-36.
80. C.L. Galletly & J. Dickson-Gomez, HIV Seropositive Status Disclosure to Prospective Sex
Partners and Criminal Laws That Require It: Perspectives of Persons Living with HIV, 20 INT'L J. STD
& AIDS 613, 617 (2009). Galletly and Dickson-Gomez's qualitative study of HIV-positive Michigan
residents revealed an unequivocal belief among participants that those living with HIV have a duty to
disclose their statuses to prospective sexual partners. Id. at 614. Interestingly, California's criminal HIV
exposure statute is unique in that it contains several provisions relating to protection of the victim's (but
not the defendant's) identity during the grand jury and trial processes. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
120291 (c)(1)-(4) (2006).
81. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the
State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 139-40 (1988) (detailing briefly the rationale behind public
health and criminal measures relating to HIV transmission and exposure).
82. See Rebecca Bennett, Should We Criminalize HIV Transmission?, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE 225, 227-29 (Charles A. Erin & Suzanne Ost eds., 2007) (discussing the
tension between a criminal approach rooted in a belief that criminal laws will deter behavior that risks
HIV transmission and the public health perspective's acknowledgement that transmission "often occurs
in a situation of reduced rationality").
83. Wolf& Vezina, supra note 40, at 831; see also Grant, supra note 70, at 168 (noting that public
health law "works best when those who are subject to it are cooperative").
84. UNAIDS BRIEF, supra note 77, at 2 & n.6 (citing G.A. Res. 60/262, 25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/262 (June 15, 2006)).
85. Cf Gable et al., supra note 8, at 262 (arguing that the law should support public health efforts
to educate vulnerable and at-risk populations so that they can protect themselves and empower public
health officials to engage in surveillance, screening, and testing).
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disease.8 6 Effective HIV prevention is also dependent upon the education of the
general public,8 7 and in the ability to communicate ways to avoid or reduce risk of
exposure. 88 In order for a public health-oriented scheme of prevention to be
effective in the context of a disease that is so interlaced with issues of private,
sexual behavior, those who are at risk for infection must trust in the confidentiality
of testing sites and any information provided to them by health counselors.8 9
Although criminal HIV exposure statutes are almost always justified on
grounds that they aid in preventing the spread of HIV,90 there are other
considerations in criminal law that are often at odds with the public health
approach.91 As with any criminal law, HIV-specific statutes seek to punish people
who engage in criminally culpable conduct-and the intentional or reckless
exposure of another person to a potentially fatal and certainly life-altering disease
certainly fits this description.92 Further, to the extent criminal law also aims to
produce norms of conduct, criminal HIV exposure statutes arguably work to deter
behavior that risks transmitting the virus to an unknowing victim.93 Finally, it also
86. See CDC CRITICAL CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 2 (detailing prevention programs for people
living with HIV and noting that they "help ensure [people diagnosed with HIV] do not transmit the virus
to others").
87. See id. at 4-5 (noting that "too many Americans are still at risk for HIV," and detailing the
populations at greatest risk).
88. Gable et al., supra note 8, at 261. For a critical analysis of the notion that non-HIV-infected
individuals bear a burden equal to HIV-positive individuals regarding risk reduction of the sexual
transmission of HIV, see Grant, supra note 70, at 160. Grant argues this premise is "based on a
construction of heterosexual relationships as involving two equal participants with equal power to assert
in the context of sexual activity," and that this construction does not reflect many relationships as they
actually exist. Id.
89. See Cameron et al., supra note 77 (discussing the implications of the fact that "when it comes to
sex, with its potent elements of need, want, trust, passion, shame, fear, risk, and heedlessness, normal,
reasonable people simply do not always follow public health guidelines"). Cf Burris et al., supra note
20, at 477 (citing John E. Anderson et al., HIV Testing in the United States, 2002, ADVANCE DATA,
Nov. 8, 2005, at 1, 11-12 (2005)) (noting that research supports the proposition that people who know
they are infected and are given the tools to help protect others are less likely to transmit HIV, but that
more than one third of people engaging in risky behavior have never been tested).
90. Sullivan & Field, supra note 81, at 158-60.
91. See Arianne Stein, Note, Should HIV Be Jailed? HIV Criminal Exposure Statutes and Their
Effects in the United States and South Africa, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 177, 180-81 (2004)
(noting in addition to the purported goal of halting the spread of HIV, the three primary objectives of
criminal HIV statutes are "incapacitation, promotion of normative behavior, and deterrence") (internal
citations omitted).
92. Gostin, supra note 10, at 1038; Mosiello, supra note 37, at 609. For a more detailed articulation
of the potential harmful effects of failing to disclose HIV status sexual partners, see Grant, supra note
70, at 149.
93. Zita Lazzarini et al., Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk Behavior, 30 J. L.
MED & ETHICS 239, 239 (2002). But see UNAIDS POLICY OPTONS PAPER, supra note 76, at 21
(arguing that deterrence is a poor justification for HIV-specific criminal statutes in practice because it is
difficult to deter "spontaneous behaviour," and that fear of infection likely does just as much, if not
more, to deter conduct that risks spreading HIV).
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is often suggested that prosecution and punishment under to these statutes serves to
incapacitate those whose culpable behavior threatens to spread HIV.94 While these
goals are all legitimate, they often necessarily compete with the public health
perspective so reliant on education and voluntariness to combat spread of HIV. 95
To the extent that legislators do not consider the primacy of traditional public
health approaches to HIV prevention when drafting criminal exposure statutes,
96
laws tend to get written in ways that are either silent on or discouraging of risk-
reducing behaviors and thus tend to undermine the public education efforts.97
Generally, the American public seems to favor criminal charges for those who
knowingly infect another person with HIV.95 In the decades since states started
bringing criminal charges against people accused of knowingly or intentionally
exposing others to HIV via specific statutes, the debate as to whether this is a good
idea or bad idea has become highly contentious.99 While arguments in favor of
these laws all tend to focus on notions of public health'00 and holding criminally
accountable people found to have engaged in immoral conduct,'0 1 the arguments
against specific criminal HIV exposure statutes are varied and not always
interrelated. 10 2 Generally those who advocate repealing criminal HIV exposure
laws make arguments that fall into one of three categories, none of which are
94. E.g., Grant, supra note 70, at 149. Grant also observes that the "language of rehabilitation, or
concern for the accused's welfare, is starkly absent" in cases dealing with criminal HIV exposure. Id.
95. O'Toole, supra note 67, at 185.
96. See Strader, supra note 20, at 446 (noting that general HIV-statutes are often so broad that they
capture conduct that carries no real risk of HIV transmission, and that it is generally difficult for
legislators to draft statutes that are clear and fair).
97. WEBBER, supra note 16, at 7-56 n.211 to 7-56.1 (citing Sullivan & Field, supra note 81, at
196).
98. Wolf& Vezina, supra note 40, at 825 (citing 142 CONG. REc. E1447 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996))
("[M]ore than three-quarters of Americans agreed that those who knowingly infect another person with
HIV should face criminal charges."); see also Robert 0. Boorstinc, Criminal and Civil Litigation on
Spread of AIDS Appears, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1987, at Al (reporting that public opinion polls in the
late 1980s indicated more than half of respondents supported a law making it a crime for a person
infected with HIV to have sex with another person).
99. See, e.g., James Janega, Student Charged in HIV Case Gets New Lawyer: AIDS Advocates
Watch Dakota Case, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2002, at 5 (noting that, since the mid-1980s, legal scholars and
public interest advocates have debated whether or not criminalizing HIV exposure is counterproductive
in the effort to prevent HIV transmission).
100. See, e.g., Karen E. Lahey, Note, The New Line of Defense: Criminal HIV Transmission Laws, I
SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 85, 95 (1995) (suggesting HIV-specific statutes that "address the
intricacies of the HIV virus and how it is transmitted" could serve the goal of reducing transmission).
101. See, e.g., Kromm, supra note 63, at 255 (arguing that properly drafted criminal HIV exposure
statutes can ensure those who knowingly transfer the virus are punished and also supply the deterrent
effect needed to prevent future such cases); Mona Markus, A Treatment for the Disease: Criminal HIV
Transmission/Exposure Laws, 23 NOVA L. REV. 847, 850-51 (1999) (arguing criminal HIV exposure
laws afford easier conviction of those who intentionally transmit the virus and also communicate what
conduct is prohibited and what conduct is permissible).
102. See, e.g., Cameron et al., supra note 77 (providing ten distinct arguments against the use of
criminal HIV statutes).
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mutually exclusive: 1) practical policy arguments related to HIV prevention;'0 3 2)
fairness arguments relating to defendants charged under the laws;104 and 3) fairness
arguments relating to the HIV-positive population generally.'0 5 Additionally,
scholars conducting empirical research into the practical operation of these laws
have argued the desirable effects touted by supporters are not necessarily
occurring. ° 6 Implicit in many of these arguments against HIV exposure laws are
challenges to the deterrent, retributive, and incapacitation justifications generally
set out by proponents.1
0 7
A. Practical Policy Concerns
Overwhelmingly, the case against criminal HIV exposure laws is made on the
practical policy front. One of the most frequent arguments encountered is that
specific HIV transfer statutes deter people, especially those at high risk for
infection, from getting tested for the virus.0 8 Because every state's statute at
minimum requires that a person know he is HIV-positive,' 0 9 some express concern
103. See, e.g., Wolf & Vezina, supra note 40, at 869-70 (arguing that HIV-specific statutes deter
testing and have not been demonstrated effective at actually preventing HIV); O'Toole, supra note 67, at
206-07 (arguing that favoring a public health approach over criminal statutes will better encourage
testing and education, and further free up resources for proven prevention methods).
104. See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 37, at 357 (emphasizing the danger of selective prosecution
against gay men and other minority or unpopular groups); O'Toole, supra note 67, at 205 ("[E]very
defendant in criminal transmission prosecutions is also a victim of the same crime by nature of his/her
infected status.").
105. See, e.g., Galletly & Dickson-Gomez, supra note 80, at 617 (indicating that HIV-positive
people have reported feeling vulnerable to hostility and discrimination, and that disclosure laws do not
adequately account for potential negative impacts, including unwanted secondary disclosure); Galletly &
Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 335 (arguing that statutes not narrowly tailored to address only the most
risky behaviors "increase the likelihood of unfounded discrimination against persons infected with
HIV"); Strader, supra note 20, at 446-47 (arguing that criminal HIV exposure laws "provide broad
condemnation of large groups of society"). Criminal HIV exposure statutes have also been subject to
many constitutional challenges in a number of states. See supra Part 1.B for a more detailed discussion
of the constitutional arguments against these laws.
106. Burris et al., supra note 20, at 507; Lazzarini et al., supra note 93, at 247.
107. See, e.g., Lazzarini et al., supra note 93, at 239-40 (discussing the theoretical versus practical
impact of HIV-specific criminal laws on accepted perceptions of the criminal law's function).
108. Wolf & Vezina, supra note 40, at 869-70. Wolf and Vezina note further that studies indicate
more than half of people who test positive for HIV do not return to the testing centers to receive their
results. Id.
109. A few statutes explicitly define what evidence is required to prove a defendant knew he was
infected with HIV. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (2006) (providing knowledge where a
"person knows he or she has tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus"); MICH. COMP. LAW
ANN. § 333.5210(t) (West 2001) (providing a person has knowledge of HIV infection when "he or she
has or has been diagnosed as having acquired immunodeficiency syndrome"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 201.205(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (providing knowledge is "testing positive in a test approved by the state
board of health for exposure to the human immunodeficiency virus and receiving actual notice of that
fact"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (B) (LexisNexis 2006) (providing knowledge where "the person
has tested positive as a carrier of a virus that causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome"). How and
when the knowledge requirement of many criminal HIV exposure statutes may be satisfied has been the
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that people will refrain from testing so as to remain outside the scope of the
criminal HIV exposure laws. 10 The use of otherwise confidential test results in
criminal prosecutions might also compromise the sense of trust a person has in the
agencies and organizations that provide services and resources to the communities
at risk for HIV infection. I l' Obviously, if these sorts of deterrence dynamics exist,
they undermine one of the cornerstones of HIV prevention: voluntary testing and
subsequent education, counseling, and treatment. LI2 While this logic certainly
appears compelling, the empirical evidence that exists actually suggests that HIV
exposure statutes have not had this sort of dramatic chilling effect on HIV
testing." 3 Scholars have offered a few explanations for why this might be the case,
including the idea that the potentially negative consequences of criminal liability
are far outweighed by the many positive things to be gained by knowing one's HIV
status. 14 While HIV-positive individuals certainly have reported a fear of criminal
prosecution,1 5 it is hard to ignore the many benefits that come with knowing
whether one is infected with HIV, including treatment options that increasingly
extend life expectancies of those living with the virus 1 6 and the ability to protect
loved ones from infection." 7
The more recent literature relating to the criminalization of HIV offers what
are perhaps more convincing practical policy arguments against enacting HIV-
specific exposure statutes. First, the overwhelming majority of such statutes are
bereft of language regarding safe sex or condom use." 8 Some statutes also prohibit
source of much debate. See, e.g., Lahey, supra note 100, at 88-90 (discussing the "constructive
knowledge approach" some jurisdictions employ when evidence of actual knowledge cannot be found);
Mosiello, supra note 37, at 614-17 (discussing whether and when a court may impute knowledge of
HIV status, absent the existence of official test results).
110. Hermann, supra note 37, at 357.
111. See O'Toole, supra note 67, at 192-93 (discussing the role of confidentiality in HIV exposure
laws). Webber further makes the argument that the use of test results in criminal prosecutions also
discourages disclosure by those who do not obtain informed consent prior to their first sexual encounter
because to do so would be to "admit to having committed a felony." WEBBER, supra note 16, at 7-55 to
7-56. Because a public health approach favors late disclosure over no disclosure, the effect "runs counter
to an important public health goal." Id.
112. Cf Burris et al., supra note 20, at 477 (emphasizing the importance of voluntary testing in the
fight to stop the spread of HIV, and noting that "getting those at risk to come in for testing has proven
far from easy").
113. Id. at 512.
114. See Grant, supra note 70, at 157 (suggesting that individuals have strong reason to want to
know their statuses in order to seek treatment, to modify behavior so as to protect loved ones, and, if
pregnant, to safeguard the health of a fetus); Rebecca Ruby, Note, Apprehending the Weapon Within:
The Case for Criminalizing the Intentional Transmission of HIV, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 313, 318 (1999)
(noting that, because drug combinations can extend and improve the quality of life for HIV-positive
individuals, the incentive to get tested is greater).
115. Galletly & Dickson-Gomez, supra note 80, at 617.
116. McGuire, supra note 52, at 1808.
117. Grant, supra note 70, at 157; Sullivan & Field, supra note 81, at 184.
118. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 335-36.
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conduct that has never been shown to actually transmit the virus-exchange of
saliva or the use of uncontaminated sex toys, for instance 119-alongside behavior
that is in fact very high risk if proper precautions are not taken.,20 Thus, there is a
real danger that these laws communicate messages that at best undermine, and at
worst run directly counter to, public health efforts to combat the spread of HIV.1
21
We also live in a world of limited resources, and it is quite possible that the
significant amounts of money being spent on the criminal prosecution of the
knowing exposure to H1V might be better spent elsewhere. 122 Finally, some counter
the already-weak incapacitation argument by pointing out that those who are
convicted, particularly those who do harbor the intent to infect others, are sent to
prison where access to condoms is rare and rape is a significant problem.'
23
B. Fairness to Defendants
In addition to practical policy arguments generally against the use of criminal
HIV exposure statutes, advocates have raised a number of fairness issues relating to
individual defendants and to the HIV-positive population at large. For as long as
scholars and advocates have been writing about specific HIV laws, the problem of
selective prosecution has been consistently flagged, even by writers spanning the
spectrum of opinion on the issue.' 24 Prosecutors appear to have wide, uncabined
discretion as to when and against whom charges are brought. 125 Indeed, prosecution
under HIV exposure statutes appears to be largely a product of "the accident of
being caught" and "the attention of a willing prosecutor.' '126 Once prosecution has
begun, it is not implausible that a defendant will face jury members with negative
preconceived notions about HIV-positive individuals, who may attribute a greater
119. McArthur, supra note 34, at 722-23.
120. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 335.
121. Id. at 335-36.
122. Scott A. McCabe, The Maryland Survey: 1995-1996: Recent Decisions: The Maryland Court
of Appeals, 56 MD. L. REV. 656, 775 (1997). It is also important to note here, and to keep in mind
generally, that the criminal conduct at issue here is sex that is otherwise consensual. Non-consensual sex
"is rape, and rape should always be prosecuted." Cameron et al., supra note 77.
123. Lazzarini et al., supra note 93, at 249.
124. Compare, e.g., Markus, supra note 101, at 862 (acknowledging the risk of prejudicial or
selective enforcement in the context of criminal prosecutions for knowingly exposing another to HIV,
yet arguing that specific statutes are still desirable if drafted correctly), with Grant, supra note 70, at 174
(noting that, given the demographics of HIV/AIDS, criminal HIV exposure statutes "run the risk of
selecting out particularly vulnerable populations for criminal sanction," and thus recommending Canada
not adopt specific HIV exposure laws).
125. Lazzarini et al., supra note 93, at 240; cf. Sullivan & Field, supra note 81, at 189-91
(discussing the danger that HIV-specific exposure statutes will be used by the state to harass members of
unpopular groups); Glenn Puit, Prosecution Rare: Unprotected Sex Leads to Charges, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Sept. 11, 2001, at I B (reporting on the case of gay men charged pursuant to Nevada's HIV-specific
exposure statue, and noting that the law is most often brought to bear against prostitutes).
126. Lazzarini et al., supra note 93, at 247.
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degree of culpability than is warranted. 127 As law professor Mona Markus suggests,
"[a] jury that disapproves of certain lifestyles might consider the commonplace
practices of people who live that lifestyle as a deviation from law-abiding conduct
even where that conduct is perfectly legal."'128 Further, prosecution necessarily
involves speaking openly and publicly about extremely private matters of health
and sexual intimacy, which is understandably distressing to many.
129
C. Fairness to the HIV-Positive Community
Recent research indicates that the majority of those living with HIV believe
they have a duty to disclose their status to potential sexual partners. 130 At the same
time, it is also argued that specific HIV laws that criminally enforce this duty are
unjustified in light of the negative impact they have on the HIV-positive population
generally. 131 Broadly speaking, these laws can amplify and exacerbate the stigma,
prejudice, and discrimination that already result from widely held stereotypes about
HIV-positive people. 132 Although there are other sexually transmitted diseases that
127. Markus, supra note 101, at 855; Sullivan & Field, supra note 81, at 179; see also Ruby, supra
note 114, at 333 (discussing the likelihood of juror discrimination). Ruby argues that a better way to
address the issue of intentional or knowing exposure of HIV is via creating penalty enhancements for
already existing criminal laws. Id. at 314. She raises the issue of juror discrimination in this context,
where the defendant's HIV-positive status would need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury
who may be more likely to infer guilt because of its "irrational fears of the disease." Id. at 333. Similar
problems ofjuror discrimination and bias no doubt exist where a defendant is being prosecuted under an
HIV-specific criminal statute.
128. Markus, supra note 101, at 855. See also Matthew Weait, Criminal Law and the Sexual
Transmission of HIV: R v Dica, 68 MOD. L. REv. 121, 133-34 (2005), for an articulation of slightly
different concerns relating to juror bias. Although Weait writes in the context of British prosecutions for
the knowing exposure of HIV, his argument that juries may have pre-conceived notions about the
dynamics of various different types of relationships is relevant, especially to those states in which
informed consent can be a defense to prosecution under HIV exposure statutes. Id. Essentially, Weait
suggests convictions may turn in part on the "inevitably subjective evaluations by juries about whether
the relationship [a defendant had with his] partner was one in which consent to the risk of infection was
likely." Id. at 134.
129. Cf. Galletly & Dickson-Gomez, supra note 80, at 616 (noting that the very nature of HIV
disclosure laws "broadcasts to others that a person is infected with HIV").
130. Id. at 614. Research also indicates people who know they are HIV-positive do in fact take steps
to prevent transmitting the virus to other people. UNAIDS BRIEF, supra note 77, at 2 (citing Gary Marks
et al., Meta-Analysis of High-Risk Sexual Behavior in Persons Aware and Unaware They Are Infected
with HIV in the United States: Implications for HIV Prevention Programs, 39 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 446, 448 (2005)).
131. Cf Sullivan & Field, supra note 81, at 148-49 (arguing against status-based quarantine as a
means to combat the spread of HIV because it implies that all AIDS victims are unable to control
themselves and could lead to the harming of an unpopular minority).
132. Cameron et al., supra note 77. Cameron also links back to policy arguments against specific
criminal laws for HIV exposure by noting that this stigma is often a force behind reluctance to get tested
or to seek resources and information. Id.; see also Gregory M. Herek et al., HIV-Related Stigma and
Knowledge in the United States: Prevalence and Trends, 1991-1999, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 371, 376
(2002) (discussing a longitudinal study of AIDS-related attitudes and concluding that AIDS stigma is
still present in the United States).
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can have grave consequences, HIV is the only such disease that states have chosen
to criminalize specifically to such a great extent.' 33 Early in the epidemic, HIV and
AIDS particularly afflicted gay men and intravenous drug users,134 thus laws that
explicitly link HIV-positive status to criminality might have a disproportionately
adverse effect on the perception of already unpopular and vulnerable groups.'
35
Advocates also argue that criminal exposure statues unfairly place the entire burden
of disease prevention on those infected with the virus,1 36 and do not assign to those
who are HIV-negative a responsibility to protect themselves. 137 This argument also
relates back to the policy debate.' 38 Putting the legal responsibility for stemming
the spread of HIV solely on those who are H1V-positive diminishes the "public
health message of shared responsibility for sexual health between sexual
partners., 139 Some have also noted that HIV has been a public health concern for
almost three decades at this point, and thus the risk of infection is an "inescapable
facet of having sex., 140 Given that the risk of HIV transmission is simply part of the
contemporary sexual environment, the responsibility for practicing safe sex is
properly shouldered by everyone. 14 1 While it is hard to imagine that anyone would
deny that an HIV-positive person has a non-delegable moral duty to avoid
transmitting the virus to others, it is also perhaps not entirely fair or prudent to rest
the responsibility for disease prevention entirely within one population.1
42
133. WEBBER, supra note 16, at 7-47.
134. Current Trends Update, supra note 4, at 465.
135. Cf Gable et al., supra note 8, at 262 (noting that anti-sodomy laws, which are typically
associated with homosexuals, can have the harmful effect of "driv[ing] these individuals underground"
as the laws "become guises for discrimination").
136. See generally Matthew Weait, Taking the Blame: Criminal Law, Social Responsibility and the
Sexual Transmission of HIV, 23 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 441, 452-53 (2001) (discussing the notion
of shared responsibility in the context of sexual transmission of HIV).
137. Galletly & Dickson-Gomez, supra note 80, at 617. Galletly and Dickson-Gomez also note the
"particular irony" that the law "assigns responsibility for HIV prevention to the party that is most likely
to be sexually deprived." Id.
138. See supra Part I1.A for a broader discussion of the policy debate relating to the use of HIV-
specific criminal statutes.
139. UNAIDS BRIEF, supra note 77, at 5.
140. Cameron et al., supra note 77.
141. Id. For a more philosophical discussion of the role of disclosure and consent it relates to HIV
and sexual behavior, see S.D. Pattinson, Consent and Informational Responsibility, 35 J. MED. ETHICS
176, 178 (2009). Pattinson suggests that where a person has general knowledge of the risks of HIV
transmission-and he further notes that most "educated Western" people will-he is on notice to ask
sexual partners about their HIV status or otherwise protect his interest by using condoms, among other
options. Id.
142. See. e.g., Weait, supra, note 128, at 128-29. Weait argues the consent defense should apply to
those situations where an HIV-negative person may have reason to know his non-disclosing sexual
partner is HIV-positive; for example, he may know his partner is sexually active with a number of
people or does not regularly practice safe sex. Id. at 128. In proffering this argument, he is careful to
explicitly note he is not seeking to "deny the moral turpitude of those who fail to provide their sexual
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III. MARYLAND'S HEALTH-GENERAL CODE: CRIMINALIZING HIV TRANSMISSION
Maryland's criminal HIV exposure statute states simply that "[a]n individual
who has the human immunodeficiency virus may not knowingly transfer or attempt
to transfer the human immunodeficiency virus to another individual," and that a
person in violation of the provision is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined up
to $2,500 and/or be incarcerated for a term of up to three years. 143 Though unique
in several aspects,' 44 Maryland's criminal HIV exposure statute has apparently
flown under the radar and escaped much of the scrutiny applied by jurists and
scholars to similar statutes in other states.145 Maryland is one of seven states that
declined to codify its statute among its criminal laws, choosing instead the Health-
General Code. 146 The penalties for violation of Maryland's HIV exposure law fall
at the low end of the spectrum, 147 and it is the only state to make violation of its law
a misdemeanor, rather than a felony. 148 Even more notable than its procedural or
technical oddities, Maryland's criminal HIV exposure statute stands out as one of
the broadest facial articulations of what conduct is prohibited and which HIV-
positive actors may be captured. 149 Indeed, Maryland's statute has been
characterized as "a study in ambiguity" for its lack of guidance regarding
"acceptable behaviors and thresholds of risk."' 150
partners with information which may enable them to make better informed decisions about the kind of
sex they are willing to have." Id.
143. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009).
144. See, e.g., Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 333 (noting Maryland is the only state to
classify criminal exposure to HIV via sexual activity as a misdemeanor); Wolf& Vezina, supra note 38,
at 854-55 (noting Maryland is one of only three states failing to address the role of informed consent in
its criminal HIV exposure statute).
145. See generally Christina M. Shriver, State Approaches to Criminalizing the Exposure of HIV."
Problems in Statutory Construction, Constitutionality, and Implications, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 319, 323-
47 (2001) (analyzing criminal HIV exposure statutes of sixteen states, not including Maryland).
146. The other states housing their criminal HIV exposure statutes in health-related sections of their
codes are California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 120291 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608
(2002); MICH. COMp. LAW ANN. § 333.5210; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677.1 (West 2004); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 4429-145 (2002).
147. Compare MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1(b) (indicating penalties for conviction are
up to three years imprisonment and/or a fine of $2500), with IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(1) (providing
up to fifteen years imprisonment for conviction), and IOWA CODE §§ 709C. 1(3), 902.9(2) (West 2003 &
Supp. 2010) (providing up to twenty-five years imprisonment for conviction).
148. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 333.
149. Id. at 331.
150. Id.
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A. Broad Language, Narrow Application?
At first glance, Maryland's statute appears broad and all encompassing,
especially when compared to the language of similar statutes in other states.'
15
Given the wide breadth of the population (any individual who knows he is HIV-
positive), and the lack of guidance as to proscribed behavior or the role of consent,
Maryland's law appears to capture a broad range of actors and conduct-perhaps
even including the person who discloses his status to a sexual partner and also uses
a condom. A closer look at the language and Maryland law reveals that this is not
the case, and that Maryland's criminal HIV exposure statute is perhaps as narrow
and limited in application as the California statute, 152 which has been described as
unfriendly to prosecutors. 153 Maryland can prosecute an HIV-positive individual if
he either actually transfers or attempts to transfer the virus to another. 154 The first
scenario runs into causation and mens rea problems.1 55 The prosecutor must
establish that the victim was infected with HIV after a sexual encounter with the
defendant and that the defendant is the person who infected the victim. 
156
Additionally, the prosecutor must prove that the defendant knew transmission could
happen before or during the specific sexual act resulting in infection. 57 The second
scenario, an attempt to transfer, requires that the prosecution prove a defendant
acted with the specific intent to transfer the virus, rather than only recklessly or
with disregard for the fact that transmission or exposure could result.158 Thus, it
151. See, for example, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
16.2 (West 2002), or IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1, statutes that are all significantly longer than MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1, and delve into far greater detail regarding definitions, defenses,
and evidentiary requirements.
152. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(a); see also John M. Glionna, Law on HIV Infection
Little Used: As a Victim Finds, State's Tough Standard Means Few Who Knowingly Pass the Virus Are
Prosecuted, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at I (commenting on the specific intent requirement to
California's HIV-specific statute, and noting that as of 2003 only one person has been convicted
pursuant to it); HIV and Full Disclosure, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at 12 (noting that California's civil
statute makes prosecution of knowing HIV exposure easier than does the state's criminal statute).
153. See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 332 (noting that a congressional aide actually went
on record to describe California's intent requirement as a "nearly impossible" standard to meet, making
the law "pretty much meaningless"); Shriver, supra note 145, at 327 (indicating that recklessness is not
sufficient to satisfy the specific intent to transmit required by California's statute and that prosecutors
must prove malice, making the statute a difficult one to prosecute).
154. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH--GEN. § 18-601.1.
155. Cf McGuire, supra note 52, at 1797-98 (discussing causation and mens rea hurdles relating to
prosecution of HIV transmission under the law of murder, which often required proving actual
transmission).
156. Cf. Hermann, supra note 37, at 363--64 (noting the difficulty of proving two necessary negative
facts-that the victim was not HIV-positive prior to the alleged conduct and that the victim was not
infected by some other source-in the context of a homicide prosecution for HIV transmission).
157. McGuire, supra note 52, at 1797.
158. For an articulation of Maryland's law of attempt, see Dabney v. State, 858 A.2d 1084, 1089
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). In order to successfully prosecute a defendant for an attempt, the state must
establish that the defendant had the mens rea of intent to commit a particular crime and also that he took
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appears that Maryland's statute captures only a small universe of HIV-positive
individuals who engage in risky behavior with the knowledge and intention of
actually transferring the virus to another.
The legislative history of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Omnibus
Bill1 59 further supports an interpretation that gives the statute a limited application.
First, the preamble indicates that the bill as a whole was concerned with allaying
"[p]ublic fears and misconceptions of methods of HIV infection [that] have resulted
in discrimination against persons with HIV infection."'16 The fact that a criminal
HIV statute with a broad sweep is more, not less, likely to foster discrimination and
bias among the HIV-positive population countenances in favor of inferring that the
Maryland General Assembly intended a strict construction of the statute. 161 Even
more convincing is the fact that the preamble indicates the legislature's
understanding that the "willful and intentional exposure of others by an infected
person poses a serious public health threat.' '162 While admittedly not contained in
the statute itself, the use of the words willful and intentional to describe the
proscribed conduct suggests the legislature intended to punish only those who act
with culpability higher than recklessness.
B. Maryland's Use of Traditional Criminal Law
Historically, Maryland has used the traditional criminal law as a means of
deterring and punishing exposure to and transmission of HIV, and continues to do
so. 163 In Smallwood v. State, 64 the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the
a "substantial step, beyond mere preparation, toward commission of a targeted crime." Id.; see also
Jennifer Grishkin, Note, Knowingly Exposing Another to HIV, 106 YALE L. J. 1617, 1622 n.31 (1997)
(noting Maryland's statute "require[s] a showing of intent to transfer the virus, which leaves the State in
the same position as proving intent to kill"); McArthur, supra note 34, at 721 n.106 (commenting on
Maryland's "surprisingly small punishment" in light of the fact that a prosecutor must prove "knowing
transmission" in order to convict). Grishkin suggests that, because the Maryland statute refers only to
transmission or attempted transmission, and not exposure, the burden of proof for the prosecution is
actually more rigorous than other states. Grishkin, supra, at 1622 n.3 1.
159. Ch. 789, 1989 Md. Laws 4293, 4306 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
§ 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009)).
160. Id. at 4295.
161. See State v. Fabritz, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (Md. 1975) (citing the "well settled" rule that "penal
statutes must be strictly construed"). For additional discussion of the stigmatizing effects criminal HIV
exposure statutes can have on the HIV-positive population, see supra Parts II.B-C.
162. Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Omnibus Bill, ch. 789, 1989 Md. Laws at 4295 (emphasis
added); see also AIDS ADMIN., MD. DEPT. HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, COUNSELING, TESTING AND
REFERRAL PROGRAM COUNSELOR KNOWLEDGE EvALUATION SELF-LEARNING PACKET-FY08, at 11
(2008) available at http://dhmh.maryland.gov/AIDS/ProviderResources/CTR/SelP/o2OLearning%20
FY08.pdf (indicating that a person who violates "this willful exposure provision is guilty of a
misdemeanor") (emphasis added).
163. See, e.g., CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, PROSECUTIONS FOR HIV EXPOSURE IN THE U.S.,
2008-2010 (2010) (providing an "illustrative, not exhaustive," chart of recent criminal HIV
prosecutions, and indicting that Maryland has seen at least three since June 2008); Daniel Ostrovsky,
Maryland Case Triggers Question: Should Exposure of HIV Be a Felony?, KAN. CITY DAILY REc.
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question of whether a court may infer a specific intent to kill from conduct that
risks HIV transmission. 165 Smallwood, an HIV-positive defendant, was convicted
of attempted first-degree rape, robbery, assault with intent to murder, reckless
endangerment, and three counts of attempted second-degree murder. 166 The Court
found that, within a five-day period in 1993, Smallwood had robbed and then raped
three different women at gunpoint, and did not wear a condom during any of the
attacks.
67
Smallwood appealed his assault with intent to murder and attempted murder
convictions, contending evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the
required specific intent to kill. 168 Specific intent to kill may be inferred, inter alia,
where a person directs a deadly weapon at a vital part of the human body.' 69 For
example, it is reasonable to assume that a person who points a loaded gun at
another person's chest and pulls the trigger intends his victim to die "as a natural
and probable consequence of his actions."' 170 In holding that evidence did not
support Smallwood's convictions of assault with intent to murder and attempted
murder,' 7 1 the Court reasoned that it is unclear that death by AIDS is both a natural
and probable consequence of exposure to HIV so as to support an inference of
specific intent to kill.
72
Notably, Smallwood argued on appeal that reckless endangerment, 173 not
attempted murder, was the appropriate charge given the facts of his case. 174 Courts
(Mo.), Jul. 11, 2006 (reporting that a Maryland defendant accused of having unprotected sex without
disclosing his HIV-positive status was charged with three misdemeanors: second-degree assault,
reckless endangerment, and violation of Maryland's HIV-specific exposure statute); Patricia M. Murret,
Man Sentenced for Exposing Woman He Met Online to HIV, GAZETTE, Mar. 10, 2010,
http://www.gazette.net/stories/03102010/montnew202848_32557.php (reporting that a Montgomery
County man was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for reckless endangerment and knowingly
exposing others to HIV).
164. 680 A.2d 512 (Md. 1996).
165. Id. at 515-16 (holding that the specific intent to kill necessary to first-degree murder
prosecutions could not be inferred from intentional conduct exposing another to HIV).
166. Id. at 513-14. Smallwood was not prosecuted under Maryland's criminal HIV exposure statute,
an omission that is perhaps meaningful given that conviction constitutes only a misdemeanor. One could
plausibly argue that the absence of any reference to Maryland's criminal HIV exposure statute in the
context of Smallwood suggests the statute was not meant to apply to those situations where traditional
criminal conduct (e.g., rape or other sexual assault) is also at issue, but rather to instances of otherwise
consensual sexual intercourse.
167. Id. at 513.
168. Id. at 514.
169. Id. at 515 (citing State v. Raines, 606 A.2d 265, 269 (Md. 1992)).
170. Id. at 516.
171. Id. at 618.
172. Id. at 516 (emphasis added). The Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in this case was
controversial. Kromm, supra note 63, at 261-62. Kromm notes that many states passed criminal HIV
exposure statutes in the wake of Smallwood. Id. at 262.
173. In Maryland, a person is guilty of reckless endangerment when he recklessly engages in
conduct that "creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another." MD. CODE ANN.,
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in other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that such conduct can constitute
reckless endangerment. 7 5 Given that the crime of reckless endangerment is focused
on the actual risky conduct of the actor and does not require that any harm actually
result, 176 it is arguably more in harmony with the public health goal of preventing
the spread of HIV than specific intent crimes are.' 77
IV. RE-WRITING MARYLAND'S HIV-SPECIFIC CRIMINAL STATUTE
In 2005, the Department of Mental Health and Hygiene estimated there were
40,000 Marylanders living with HIV/AIDS. 17 8 Although the years 2001 to 2005
revealed a decline in the infection rate to an average 2,100 annual new infections,
the rate was still high enough that "every four hours another Marylander [became]
infected with HIV."' 79 If the state intends to continue to use the criminal law as a
CRIM. LAW § 3-204 (West 2008). Three elements are required to establish a primafacie case of reckless
endangerment: 1) the defendant "engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of death or serious
physical injury to another;" 2) a "reasonable person would not have engaged in that conduct;" and 3)
"the defendant acted recklessly." Holbrook v. State, 772 A.2d 1240, 1247 (Md. 2001) (quoting Jones v.
State, 745 A.2d 396, 406 (Md. 2000)). The first test for reckless endangerment is an objective one, and
requires a court to determine whether the defendant's conduct was "so reckless as to constitute a gross
departure from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe." State v. Pagotto, 762
A.2d 97, 108 (Md. 2000) (quoting Minor v. State, 605 A.2d 138, 141 (Md. 1992)). Maryland case law
further indicates: "[i]t is the reckless conduct and not the harm caused by the conduct, if any, which the
statute was intended to criminalize." Minor, 605 A.2d at 141.
174. Smallwood, 680 A.2d at 514.
175. See generally People v. Dembry, 91 P.3d 431, 433, 438 (Colo. App. 2003) (affirming trial
jury's conviction of reckless endangerment where HIV-positive defendant sexually assaulted a foster
child in his care); Hancock v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 496, 497, 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that allegations that HIV-positive defendant repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim
over a period of two years provided sufficient basis for charge of wanton endangerment);
Commonwealth v. Cordoba, 902 A.2d 1280, 1283, 1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that an HIV-
positive defendant may have placed the victim in danger of serious bodily injury sufficient to constitute
reckless endangerment when he engaged in unprotected oral sex with her five or six times).
Interestingly, Colorado, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania do not have specific HIV statutes that broadly
criminalize the knowing transfer of HIV via sexual contact. See McArthur, supra note 34, at 709 & n. 16
(noting that twenty-one states currently have HIV-specific statutes and Colorado, Kentucky, and
Pennsylvania are not among them). All three states provide for enhanced penalties where an HIV
infected person solicits or engages in prostitution, and Pennsylvania criminalizes conduct intended to
expose another to HIV specifically in prisons and correctional facilities. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, supra note 37.
176. Cf McArthur, supra note 34, at 738 (noting that many HIV-specific statutes criminalize
conduct that only risks transmission, and do not require intent to infect). McArthur cites the MODEL
PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1985) to illustrate that recklessness is focused on conduct, not intent. Id. at 738
n.248.
177. See generally Hermann, supra note 37, at 369 (detailing the use of reckless endangerment to
prosecute conduct likely to transmit HIV); cf Wolf & Vezina, supra note 40, at 836-37 (observing that
criminal law tends to impose punishment after a violation occurs while public health law seeks to
prevent harm before it occurs).
178. AIDS ADMIN., MD. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TWENTY-FWVE YEARS OF AIDS IN
MARYLAND 8 (n.d.), available at http://www.dhmh.state.md.us/AIDS/Data&Statistics/AIDS25YR.pdf.
179. Id.
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tool to combat the spread of HIV as a way to hold accountable those who would
intentionally frustrate those efforts by having unprotected sex without disclosing
their HIV-positive status to potential partners, it needs to do so in a clear,
deliberate, and fair way. First, the Maryland legislature needs to decide whether to
prosecute intentional or reckless exposure to HIV in situations involving otherwise
consensual sex via a specific HIV-statute or via the traditional criminal law.180 Not
only is the practice of charging a defendant under both the specific and general law
a naked attempt to induce guilty pleas, but it also tends to undermine legality in the
form of clear warning as to exactly what conduct is prohibited.'81
Some argue that HIV transmission and exposure cases are ill-suited for the
criminal law, and that those who knowingly and recklessly expose others to the
virus should never be criminally prosecuted, save the rare individual who acts only
with the intent to transfer HIV to many partners. I8 2 While these advocates might
legitimately privilege public health concerns above all else, they are too quick to
dismiss one of the valid and important functions of the criminal law: retribution and
punishment. 183 Put simply, a person who recklessly or intentionally exposes another
to a fatal disease commits a wrong that warrants the social condemnation that a
criminal statute represents.1 84 The more important and messier question is how we
properly define the wrong and assign appropriate penalties, while at the same time
keeping public health goals of prevention and education, as well as risk and
180. See Markus, supra note 101, at 863 n.95 ("A good statute will clarify, either in the text or
legislative history, that it is meant to be used in place of, not in addition to, traditional criminal
offenses."). For a discussion of specific versus general laws, and their implications for plea bargains, see
Lazzarini et al., supra note 93, at 240.
181. Lazzarini et al., supra note 93, at 240; see also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-65
(rev. ed. 1969) ("[O]bscure and incoherent legislation can make legality unattainable by anyone .... ").
182. E.g., Gostin, supra note 10, at 1057 (arguing that most cases of HIV transmission are outside
the reach of the law and that those that do get noticed are likely to be the poorest and most vulnerable of
HIV-positive individuals); Sullivan & Field, supra note 81, at 195-97 (arguing that enacting criminal
laws to deal with the reckless or negligent transmission of HIV is a mistake); see also UNAIDS BRIEF,
supra note 77, at 2 ("Except in the rare cases of intentional HIV transmission, applying criminal law to
HIV transmission does not serve [retributive or deterrence] goals.").
183. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 70, at 177 (stating that we should not minimize the importance of
retribution and denunciation in the context of reckless sexual exposure to HIV). But see UNAIDS
POLICY OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 76, at 28-29 (arguing that the slope between retribution for
wrongdoing and revenge is too slippery when it comes to punishing HIV transmission and exposure).
184. Accord Gostin, supra note 10, at 1038 ("The transmission of a potentially lethal infection with
forethought or recklessness is just as dangerous as other behavior the criminal law already proscribes.").
Though he acknowledges the blameworthiness of reckless or intentional HIV exposure, Professor Gostin
does not support retribution as a sound reason for enacting HIV-specific exposure statutes. Id. at 1056.
Professor Gostin contends that it more often than not hard to establish that an offender had "evil
intentions deserving punishment," and that instead the offender "took unreasonable risks motivated by
sexual passions, physical dependence on drugs or both." Id.
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culpability, at the forefront.' 85 Although it has failed to do so thus far, it is entirely
possible for Maryland to accomplish this delicate balance.
A. HIV-Specific Versus Traditional Criminal Statutes
In Maryland, traditional criminal statutes offer a few potentially viable
options. First, the state could continue to bring charges under the reckless
endangerment statute. 8 6 However, given the relatively light penalties a reckless
endangerment conviction generally provides, such a charge may insufficiently
address and punish those most egregious instances of intentional exposure to
HIV.187 Prosecutors could also, as some scholars have advocated, prosecute
defendants under assault statutes. 188 In many states, including Maryland, such a
scheme could address variations in risk of exposure and even the virulence of a
defendant's particular strain of HIV. 189 Professor Isabel Grant provides another
provocative possibility, arguing that Canada should adopt a provision within its
sexual assault laws providing that "no consent is obtained where the accused,
knowing that he carries a sexually transmitted disease, engages in unprotected
vaginal or anal sex without disclosing his medical status to the complainant.
' 9 °
Applying this scheme, an HIV-positive individual could be charged with sexual
assault where he knows that he is HIV-positive and that the behavior he intends to
engage in (i.e. unprotected vaginal or anal sex) carries a high risk of transmitting
the virus, and either does not tell his partner that he is infected or lies about his
status.' 9' The logic here is that his partner lacks crucial information necessary to
make an autonomous and informed choice as to whether to have sex with him, and
that consent to sex would not have been given had this information been properly
disclosed. 192 In Maryland, the use of rape or sexual assault as a means to prosecute
185. See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 335-36 (discussing the challenges of drafting an
effective and fair HIV-specific statute that both punishes culpable conduct and also furthers critical
public health concerns).
186. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text (outlining reckless endangerment law in
Maryland).
187. See, e.g., McArthur, supra note 34, at 739 (detailing the use of reckless endangerment to
prosecute exposure to HIV).
188. Id. at 740-41.
189. Id. at 741. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-202(a) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2009) provides
that first-degree assault occurs where one "intentionally cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause serious physical
injury to another," whereas MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 3-203(a) simply provides, for assault in the
second-degree, that "a person may not commit an assault."
190. Grant, supra note 70, at 177.
191. See id. (advocating that the definition of consent in Canada's sexual assault statute be amended
to require disclosure of HIV-positive status, thus making non-disclosure tantamount to non-consent for
purposes of sexual assault).
192. Id. There is an important difference between non-disclosure and deceit. UNAIDS POLICY
OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 76, at 10. Sex, especially unprotected sex, is risky behavior. Both partners
shoulder responsibility for asking one another questions about past behavior, testing history, and any
other details that are important in making a risk-assessment. Id. Where, however, one partner asks those
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reckless or intentional exposure to HIV would likely require the addition of a new
statute to the sexual crimes scheme, rather than an elaboration on the definition of
consent as Professor Grant proposes for Canada.193
Maryland's current HIV-specific statute is deficient on many levels. First,
notwithstanding the fact that the legislature arguably intended to limit the scope of
the HIV-specific statute to those cases of "intentional" or "willful" exposure, 194 it
does not articulate exactly what conduct is proscribed and in what circumstances.
As written, the law is neither "clearly drawn" nor "narrowly tailored to proscribe
only the behavior that has epidemiologically been demonstrated to transmit HIV,"
and thus risks facilitating "discrimination of HIV infected people and miseducation
of the public."' 195 Maryland also needs to abandon its position as one of only three
states that fail to mention consent, 196 and provide that a defendant who discloses his
status to his sexual partners prior to engaging in risky behavior is immune from
prosecution, so long as the subsequent sexual encounter is voluntary and
consensual. 197 Further, the current HV-specific statute does not account for the
questions and receives untruthful or misleading answers from the other (i.e., that the partner is HIV-
negative or otherwise disease-free when he is in fact not), the deceitful partner has completely
foreclosed the other's ability to make an informed decision and should be held criminally accountable
for it. Cf id. (noting that "deliberate deceit" as it relates to a person's HIV-positive status is "conduct
that may be characterized as morally blameworthy and therefore deserving of punishment through
criminal sanctions").
193. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301 (providing definitions relating to Subtitle 3-Sexual
Crimes-and consent is not among them).
194. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text (suggesting that Maryland's HIV-specific
criminal statute is actually written so as to apply narrowly).
195. Mosiello, supra note 37, at 609. The concern for miseducation should not be discounted, as a
1999 study revealed that approximately fifty percent of respondents believed HIV could be transmitted
via sharing a drink out of the same glass or being coughed or sneezed on by someone who has the AIDS
virus, up from forty-eight percent and forty-six percent, respectively, in 1991. Herek et al., supra note
132, at 373. The authors of the study note that the results suggest that educational efforts have been less
than successful in "convincing the public that AIDS is not spread through casual social contact." Id. at
376.
196. Weiss, supra note 70, at 392-93.
197. See WEBBER, supra note 16, at 7-55 (noting that statutes providing a defense of informed
consent encourage those infected with HIV to disclose their statuses prior to engaging in risky behavior,
while those that do not "in effect tell people that if they test positive for HIV, they will be forbidden
from engaging in most sexual activities, even if their partner knowingly consents"); Strader, supra note
20, at 440 (noting without defenses such as informed consent or condom use, "an HIV-positive person is
consigned to a sexless life," and that "[e]ngaging in non-risky sexual activities hardly warrants criminal
penalties"). Strader notes that whether consent to high-risk sexual acts is a legally acceptable defense is
debatable. Id. at 440 & n.24. It is similarly unclear whether, in Maryland, informed consent of the victim
in an intentional or reckless HIV exposure case involving very risky conduct constitutes a defense. In
Taylor v. State, 133 A.2d 414, 415 (Md. 1957), the Maryland Court of Appeals distinguished between
two classes of criminal assault, stating that consent is an acceptable defense in only one of the classes.
Specifically, the Court provided that criminal assaults tending to disturb the public peace are viewed as
crimes against the public generally, thus consent of the victim is not a defense. Id. However, those
criminal assaults "not accompanied by threat of serious hurt or breach of the public peace" are treated as
crimes against persons, and consent of the victim is considered a defense. Id. In a case where the risk of
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spectrum of risk and culpability implicated by the different behaviors and mental
states that are involved in situations of reckless or intentional exposure to HLV.198
B. A Better HIV-Specific Statute for Maryland
Maryland can do better. After dissecting the options offered by traditional
criminal laws and critically assessing various experiments with HIV-specific
statutes, it is clear that the General Assembly should repeal the state's existing
HIV-specific statute and replace it with one that is responsive to public health
concems.' 99 While the traditional criminal law is attractive because it does not
single out HIV alone, and thus reduces the risk of discrimination or bias against
HIV-positive individuals in general, 20 0 a new statute can accomplish the same goal
while adding the specificity lacking in traditional criminal laws. 2 0 1 A statute
modeled after reckless endangerment and focused on risky conduct, but dealing
only with the issue of sexually transmitted diseases within the context of voluntary
and consensual sexual encounters, provides a potential defendant with the notice
HIV transmission is very high, it is quite plausible that the Court of Appeals would view the alleged
conduct as a "crime against the public generally," and decline to accept consent as a defense.
198. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 331 (addressing the problem of risk differentials relating
to different behaviors that might transfer HIV and suggesting that current HIV-specific criminal statutes
do not adequately account for these differences). Some have also argued that HIV-related criminal laws
must advance and adapt with the virus itself and the medical technologies that are developed to fight it.
See generally McArthur, supra note 34, at 725-31 (discussing in detail the changing HIV/AIDS
epidemic, and examining the implications new treatments have for the spectrum of risk and subsequent
culpability). The medical context surrounding HIV/AIDS is very different today from what it was in
1989 when the HIV-specific statute was first passed. For example, we now know that a number of
factors determine whether a person will become infected after exposure to HIV, including the strength of
his immune system, the stage of the HIV-positive individual's disease, the quantity of virus in the HIV-
positive individual's genital fluids, and whether or not the HIV-positive individual is receiving anti-
retroviral treatment. Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 59, at 328. We also now have medical therapies
that can reduce an HIV-positive individual's viral load, thus reducing his risk of transmitting the virus to
another as compared to a non-treated individual. McArthur, supra note 34, at 730 (citing Julio S. G.
Montaner et al., The Case for Expanding Access to Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy to Curb the
Growth of the HIV Epidemic, 368 LANCET 531, 531 (2006)); cf Glenn Betteridge, Criminal Law and
Cases of HIV Transmission or Exposure, 13 HIV/AIDS POL'Y & L. REv. 33, 34 (2008) (discussing a
Canadian case involving a defendant whose viral load was undetectable and the judge accepted expert
evidence that there was thus a "very high probability that the [defendant] was not infectious, i.e. could
not have transmitted HIV"). Unfortunately there are now also super-potent strains of the virus resistant
to certain drugs commonly used for treatment, and thus more devastating to the individual who
unknowingly contracts them. McArthur, supra note 34, at 708-09.
199. See supra Part II.A (discussing practical public health concerns that are implicated when the
reckless or intentional exposure of HIV is criminalized).
200. See supra Parts II.B-C (noting that HIV-specific legislation has the dangerous potential to
increase bias and stigma against those living with HIV, and thus it must be carefully drafted).
201. In omitting any specific reference to HIV, traditional criminal laws such as assault or reckless
endangerment do not provide clear notice to an HIV-positive individual that he could be prosecuted
specifically for an exposure or transmission-related offense. Cf FULLER, supra note 181, at 63-65
(discussing the need for clarity in the law).
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crucial to the legitimacy of any criminal law.2 °2 A clear statement on prohibited
conduct also serves prevention and education efforts by communicating accurate
information to the public relating to how HIV is contracted.20 3 Further, a narrowly
applicable statute is easily detailed to newly diagnosed HIV-positive individuals,
who are then able to discuss their obligations and how best to avoid criminal
liability with a prevention and education-oriented counselor.204 Although an HIV-
specific statute does not fully ameliorate concerns related to stigma and bias, a
specific statute does guard against the danger that jurors will unfairly apply
expansive readings of a traditional criminal statute to HIV-positive defendants
charged according to comparatively less egregious facts in order to arrive at an
unduly harsh and inappropriate result.2 0 5 A specific statute can reign in both
prosecutors and jurors by explicitly defining the narrow circumstances where risk
and culpability demand that a person be held criminally accountable for his
conduct.20 6
A useful and fair HIV-specific statute for Maryland will have at least five
components: it should 1) define knowledge as it relates to HIV status; 2) define
specifically the conduct prohibited; 3) outline conduct implicating different levels
of culpability; 4) provide affirmative defenses; and 5) provide fair and
commensurate penalties.20 7 Maryland's new statute should provide that a person
knows his HIV status for purposes of the law when he has received a positive test
202. See Ruby, supra note 114, at 323 (noting that statutes that are explicit in the behavior they
prohibit are "crucial to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system").
203. See supra notes 118-22 (discussing the grave consequences of HIV-specific laws that are not
sufficiently clear and thus do not further HIV education and prevention efforts).
204. Health practitioners-because they are on the frontlines of counseling and regularly provide
patients with test results-should be required to inform individuals who test positive of the relevant laws
and how to avoid liability. Currently in Maryland practitioners are advised that they should refer
individuals to various case management and supportive services and discuss "precautions that may be
taken to prevent infection, re-infection or transmission to others." Memorandum from the AIDS Admin.,
Md. Dep't Mental Health & Hygiene to Counseling, Testing, and Referral Sites; Health Care Providers
and Facilities 4-5 (Aug. 15, 2008), available at http://www.healthymaryland.org/documents/
H1VTestingPracticeAdvisoryAug2008F1NAL_001.pdf. Missouri provides a possible model of
regulation that ensures proper notice to HIV-positive individuals regarding the criminal laws of the
states. See State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307, 309-10 (Mo. 1998) (describing the multiple counseling
sessions received by the defendant after testing positive for HIV, and noting that Missouri's HIV-
specific criminal statute was read to the defendant, who then signed a form indicating his awareness of
the law).
205. See, e.g., Sullivan & Field, supra note 81, at 179-81 (discussing problems of juror bias and
discrimination in the context of applying traditional recklessness or criminal negligence standards to
HIV transmission).
206. Id. at 182-83.
207. See supra Part I1 (detailing important public health tensions in many current HIV-specific
statutes, and noting how a focus on these concerns can help make criminal laws relating to reckless or
intentional HIV exposure better and fairer).
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result from an HIV Counseling, Testing, and Referral (CTR) site, 208 or from a
comparable official testing center located in another state. Defining knowledge in
this way provides clarity for defendants, prosecutors, and jurors, and also better
ensures that those charged were culpably aware of the risks their conduct posed in
light of the counseling provided by CTRs. The statute should prohibit only that
sexual conduct that poses a substantial risk of HIV transmission and should plainly
articulate exactly what qualifies as such conduct. California's statute is instructive
here, defining the prohibited sexual activity as unprotected "insertive vaginal or
anal intercourse on the part of an infected male, receptive consensual vaginal
intercourse on the part of an infected woman with a male partner, or receptive
consensual anal intercourse on the part of an infected man or woman with a male
partner., 20 9 In recognition of the meaningful difference between non-disclosure and
deceit, 210 Maryland should also consider explicitly incorporating different levels of
culpable behavior into the statute. This could be accomplished via affirmative
defense provisions of disclosure and condom use. First, an individual's disclosure
of his HIV-positive status prior to the risky sexual activity should be an affirmative
defense, so long as the sexual encounter is fully voluntary and consensual.211
Maryland's statute could also provide that, in the absence of disclosure, the proper
use of a condom during all risky consensual sexual activity is an affirmative
208. See Md. AIDS Admin., Dep't of Mental Health & Hygiene, Provider Resources,
http://www.dhmh.state.md.us/AIDS/ProviderResources/index.htm (last visited June 19, 2010), for a list
of official testing centers in Maryland, as well as other testing resources and information.
209. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(b)(1) (West 2006).
210. UNAIDS POLICY OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 76, at 10 (arguing that criminal sanctions may be
applied in cases of deceit, but that "mere non-disclosure of HIV-positive status should not amount to a
criminal offence"). But see Weait, supra note 136, at 452 (noting the "moral distinction" between lying
about one's status and failing to disclose it, but arguing that the law does not recognize this distinction).
Both Professor Weait and the UNAIDS policy paper argue that one does not need to know the HIV
status of a potential sexual partner in order to make a meaningful choice regarding whether and how to
engage in sexual behavior with him or her. UNAIDS POLICY OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 76, at 10;
Weait, supra note 136, at 452. While this argument does underscore the important point that we all share
responsibility for minimizing risks in sexual encounters, there are likely many people who do not agree
with such a statement. For example, Professor Grant points out the particularly devastating
consequences of non-disclosure, including attempted suicide, and notes that "the judicial and
prosecutorial desire to recognize this harm" is understandable." Grant, supra note 70, at 149.
211. Such a provision would appropriately balance the interest of a non-infected partner's right to
know about the risks of any particular sexual encounter with the interest of an HIV-positive person's
legitimate and very human desire to express his sexuality in a responsible way. See, e.g., Lawrence 0.
Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually
Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL'Y 9, 66-67 (1998) (noting that both infected individuals and their partners have legitimate
interests that need to be considered in the context of consensual sex and that the law should aim to
balance these interests in a way that furthers societal health); Joseph W. Rose, Note, To Tell or Not to
Tell: Legislative Imposition of Partner Notification Duties for HIV Patients, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 107,
118-19 (2001) (suggesting that a statute such as North Dakota's, which requires use of a prophylactic
device and informed consent of an HIV-negative partner, provides protection for both partners that "may
be a productive step toward the maximization of societal health and safety").
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defense,212 so long as the defendant did not actively deceive his partner by lying
about his status either voluntarily or in response to questions. These defenses
encourage behaviors-disclosure and safer sex-that are central to reducing the
number of HIV transmissions. Finally, Maryland needs to reassess the penalties
applied for violation of the statute. The current misdemeanor scheme is likely
appropriate for instances of non-disclosure in the context of unprotected consensual
sexual activity-where both partners share a burden of risk and responsibility-but
it is not sufficient where the HIV-positive individual has lied to his partner, or
where an intent to infect can be demonstrated.213
CONCLUSION
If Maryland is to keep prevention of HIV transmission a priority, public
health efforts must be supported, not undermined, by the criminal law. While it is
legitimate to hold those who recklessly or intentionally expose others to HIV
criminally accountable, the state must be careful that the laws it uses to do so are
clear, effective, and fair. The HIV-specific statute that currently exists is none of
these things.
212. See Grant, supra note 70, at 177 n. 193 (suggesting that an HIV-positive individual who did not
disclose his status, but did wear a condom, should be excluded from liability because "the public interest
in promoting the use of condoms outweighs the public interest in criminalizing the failure to disclose
where a condom is used"). The CDC has reported that proper and consistent use of condoms
conclusively provides a "high degree of protection" against HIV transmission during sex because they
are an "essentially impermeable barrier to particles the size of HIV." CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, CONDOMS AND STDs: FACT SHEET FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL 2 (2009), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/condomeffectiveness/docs/Condoms-andSTDS.pdf.
213. Cf. Jaclyn Schmitt Hermes, Note, The Criminal Transmission of HIV: A Proposal to Eliminate
Iowa's Statute, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 473, 485-88 (2002) (arguing that Iowa's HIV-specific statute
provides for an excessive sentence, and suggesting that a twenty-five year sentence might be appropriate
for those who act with the specific intent to transfer the virus, but that it is unduly harsh for those who
do not intend harm).
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